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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of sequential lending in groups in micro-finance that centers
on the notion of dynamic incentives, in particular the simple idea that default incentives
should be relatively uniformly distributed across time. In a framework that allows project
returns to accrue over time, as well as strategic default, we show that sequential lending can
help resolve problems arising out of coordinated default, thus improving project efficiency
vis-a-vis individual lending. Inter alia, we also provide a justification for the use of frequent
repayment schemes, as well as demonstrate that, depending on how it is manifested, social
capital has implications for project efficiency and borrower default. We next examine the
optimal choices for the MFI and derive conditions for the optimality of the group lending
arrangement. Our framework also provides for some plausible hypotheses as to why there
has been a recent transition from group to individual lending.
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1 Introduction
This article seeks to develop a unified theory of two oft-used institutional features in micro-
finance. In a framework that allows project returns to accrue over time, as well as strategic
default, we show that (a) sequential lending can help resolve problems arising out of coordinated
default, thus improving project efficiency vis-a-vis individual lending, and (b) that frequent
repayment schemes improve dynamic incentives for repayment. We demonstrate that a socially
motivated MFI opts for a higher project size, and lends to a greater number of borrowers under
group lending. Finally, we show that this framework provides a rich explanation of the transition
from group to individual lending occurring over the last decade or so.
We consider a model where project size is endogenous, and returns are formulated dynam-
ically, as a stream of income accruing over a period of time. There is ex post moral hazard
in that the borrowers can strategically default at any point of time (see Gine et al., 2011, for
evidence on strategic default).
For the benchmark case of individual lending, we show that the optimal repayment scheme
involves immediate and frequent repayment (IFR for short), with the repayment starting early,
and continuing at the maximal feasible rate until the MFI recoups its loan, thereby demon-
strating two features that appear to be ‘near-universal’ (Bauer et al., 2008), namely early and
frequent repayment. Further, in the presence of either (a) risk-aversion, or (b) positive discount-
ing, the optimal scheme may be ‘gradual’ in the sense that it asks for less than the maximal
feasible payoff at every instant.
In the presence of a severe moral hazard problem (in a sense made formal later), however,
the efficient level of investment may not be attainable, even with IFR schemes. Given this, we
then examine whether group-lending with sequential lending can help improve efficiency.
Sequential lending, whereby loans to group members are staggered, can trace its origin to
ROSCAs (Besley et al., 1993) and has been widely adopted by many microfinance institutions
(henceforth MFIs), including Grameen I and its replicators.1 While over the last decade or so
there has been a move towards individual lending (Rai and Sjostrom, 2010), sequential lending
continues to be widely used. In India, the Self Help Group (SHG) Linkage Program, with 54
million clients in 2008-09 (Srinivasan, 2009), provides loans in sequence (Aniket, 2006, 2009).
Further, BRAC offers canonical Grameen I schemes in a number of African countries such as
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Uganda (based on discussions with BRAC International
officials, and field visits, in particular to BRAC Uganda). Even some European micro-finance
programs follow sequential lending practices (see, Molnar, 2010, and Castri, 2010). It is therefore
of interest to examine the reasons as to why it had been so widely used in the recent past, and
still continues to be used in many cases.2 Further, this allows us to develop a framework where
one can endogenously solve for whether the MFIs are going to opt for group, or individual
lending, in the process throwing some light on the recent move towards individual lending.
Under group lending the analysis focusses on the interaction between social sanctions and
collusive possibilities. Social sanctions involve the borrowers who are adversely affected because
of default, imposing some penalty on the defaulting borrower(s). While such sanctions can help
prevent default, whether such sanctions are actually imposed or not, however depend on the
1In Bangladesh, examination of the data collected by IFPRI in 1994 and used in Zeller et al. (1996) for 128
groups belonging to group-based credit programs of three MFIs (ASA, BRAC and RDRS) shows that sequential
lending was common to all three MFIs.
2de Quidt et al. (2012) report that out of 663 institutions that reported to Microfinance Information Exchange
(MIX) in 2009, 12.2% of the lenders offered joint liability loans (JLLs) exclusively, and 57.9% offered some JLLs.
Of course, this study does not tell us whether these joint liability contracts also involved sequential lending or
not.
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extent of collusion among the borrowers. We consider two scenarios, with limited, and complete
collusion. In the first case, borrowers cannot make transfers to one another in a bid to avoid
social sanctions in case of default. Thus collusion takes a limited form and simply involves not
invoking the social sanction whenever all borrowers benefit from a coordinated default. Under
the second case, we allow borrowers to make transfers among one another. Complete collusion is
modeled simply as the borrowers taking default decisions jointly, based on maximizing aggregate
group payoff. Clearly, in case of a default, the social sanctions are never invoked.
Under the first scenario with limited collusion, we find that sequential lending necessarily
improves efficiency vis-a-vis individual lending (as long as social sanctions are not too small).
The basic intuition can be explained using a two member group. Let the first recipient default
at a time when the second borrower is yet to receive her loan. Such a default adversely affects
the second borrower, who obtains no loan, and thus imposes the social sanctions. Next at the
instant when the second borrower obtains her loan, the first borrower would have already repaid
a substantial amount and thus will be adversely affected if the default by the second borrower
as the lender will liquidate both the projects. Consequently the first borrower will then impose
the social sanction.
The possibility of limited collusion implies that the second borrower cannot obtain her loan
too early in the cycle, otherwise there will be coordinated default by the borrowers. Furthermore,
the second loan can not be too delayed either since in that case when the first borrower completes
her project, she will not impose the social sanction and this may then lead to defaulting by
the second borrower. It is this subtle interaction of dynamic incentives, in particular between
sequential lending and IFR, that ensures that a higher project return can be implemented.
We next examine the scenario with complete collusion. Given that social sanctions have
no bite we find, somewhat surprisingly, that more efficient projects can be sustained compared
to that under individual lending. The intuition has to do with dynamic incentives that arise
since default decisions take group payoffs into account. For exposition, we again consider a two
member group. At the start of the project, default payoffs involves a single project while the
continuation payoff includes the total net income that arises from both these projects and thus
defaulting incentives are low. Now, at the time, when the second borrower receives its loan,
default can still be costly for the overall group. This is because at this point, the first project
has already run its course for some time, and some repayment have already been made, the
combined payoff from these two projects could be higher for the group if it did not default on
their loans. Consequently, it is possible to support the no default outcome when borrowers can
collude and make side transfers to avoid imposition of social sanctions.
The maximal sustainable loan size under complete collusion is however lower than that
under limited collusion. There are two countervailing forces at work here. While, the fact that
social sanctions have no bite under complete collusion, makes loans harder to recover, the fact
that default decisions take group payoffs into account, makes loans easier to recover. Why does
the first effect necessarily dominate? This has to do with the fact that under limited collusion
group size is taken to be large enough making social penalties an effective threat, whereas social
penalties have no bite under complete collusion.
We next consider the optimization problem facing a socially motivated MFI, i.e. one that
cares for its borrowers, a natural assumption in this context.3 Solving for the optimization
problem of such an MFI under both lending regimes, we find that both project size, as well as
3The United Nations Interagency Committee on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and the Pacific
(UNICIRDAP, 1992) mentions six characteristics of an NGO, one of them being ‘highly socially motivated and
committed’. See Besley and Ghatak (2005, 2006) for studies on incentive provision to socially motivated agents.
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the number of borrowers served are higher under group-lending.
Finally, we use this framework to analyze a phenomenon that is not very well understood,
namely the transition from group to individual lending discussed earlier. We argue that this
shift can be attributed to the increase in MFI competition that was happening around the
same time, in particular to several possible effects of such increased competition, including (i)
increased competition for donor funds, resulting in a higher opportunity cost of fund for the
MFIs, (ii) mission-drift, i.e. the MFIs becoming more profit-oriented, (iii) increased reservation
utility of borrowers, and (iv) reduced social capital. We show that all of these tend to make
group-lending relatively less attractive, thus providing a possible explanation.
The next section provides a brief review of the literature, whereas Section 3 describes the
model and analyzes the case of individual lending. Section 4 then examines a scenario with
both IFR, as well as sequential lending, under limited, as well as complete collusion. Section 5
analyzes a scenario where the MFIs optimally decide on projects sizes, etc. Section 6 then uses
this framework to analyze some questions of policy interest. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
We organize our literature review around three themes that this paper relates to.
2.1 Immediate and Frequent Repayment (IFR)
In Jain and Mansuri (2003), early repayment forces borrowers to borrow from friends/local mon-
eylenders, thus tapping into the information possessed by these agents regarding the borrowers’
credit worthiness.
In recent contributions, Fischer and Ghatak (2010, 2011) show that the presence of (i) a net
continuation value in case of repayment (which may arise either because of contingent renewal,
or from avoiding future punishment), and (ii) either present-biased preferences, or strict risk
aversion by the borrowers (in the absence of savings instruments), tighten the incentive con-
straints at the earlier stages, thus providing an explanation for frequent instalments. Moreover,
as in the present paper, they also argue that smaller amounts may be less prone to diversion.
This paper and Fischer and Ghatak (2010, 2011) offer complementary insights though, being
applicable under different scenarios. The present paper, for example, provides a theory that
does not require either a positive net continuation value in case of repayment, or the borrowers
to have either present-biased preferences, or strict risk aversion. Fischer and Ghatak (2010,
2011) on the other hand provide a theory that applies even when full repayment is possible in
the very first period, a scenario that is not allowed for in the present paper.4
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) consider a repeated game theoretic model of lending
with endogenous borrowing constraints, finding that the equilibrium contract involves paying
no dividend in the initial years. While reminiscent of our IFR result, it is driven by a different
intuition, namely that doing so allows a firm to build up equity as quickly as possible, thus
relaxing the borrowing constraint. Relatedly Shapiro (2012) examines dynamic incentives in
the presence of asymmetric information, but no enforcement problems. He shows that in all
equilibria but one, even the most patient borrowers default with probability one.
Among empirical papers, Field and Pande (2008) argue that a shift from weekly to monthly
repayment leads to no significant difference in either delay, or default. Field et al. (2011)
however find that allowing for a grace period before repayment starts, increases default. Seen
4We would like to thank Maitreesh Ghatak and Dilip Mookherjee for encouraging us to clarify these issues.
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through the lens of the present paper, such grace periods would necessitate greater repayment
later, thus pushing up the incentive to default later on. Feijenberg et al. (2013) use an experi-
mental approach to argue that more frequent meetings lead to lower default, possibly because
of improved informal risk-sharing arising out of greater social interactions.
The present paper is thus complementary to the literature in that it provides an explanation
of IFR that is not based on any of (i) asymmetric information, or (ii) a net continuation value in
case of repayment and either present-biased preferences, or strict risk aversion by the borrowers,
or (iii) social interactions.
2.2 Sequential Lending
The literature on sequential lending goes back to Varian (1990), who demonstrates that it pro-
vides incentives to high productivity borrowers to school low productivity types. Roy Chowd-
hury (2005) argues that sequential lending can encourage a high level of monitoring by the
downstream borrowers. Aniket (2006) examines this issue using a framework with endogenously
determined interest rates. Roy Chowdhury (2007) shows that in the presence of contingent re-
newal there is positive assortative matching, and, consequently, sequential lending allows the
lender to test for the composition of a group relatively cheaply. Finally, while Aniket (2009)
shows that sequential lending may widen access to less profitable projects, Sinn (2013) examines
the role of sequential lending in the presence of ex post moral hazard problems. Related papers
include Conning (2005) and Ahlin and Waters (2011).
In contrast to this literature, the present paper does not rely on either borrower monitoring,
or testing for group composition, neither does it focus on borrowers’ access to loans. Instead this
paper unearths a role for sequential lending in preventing collusion, either limited, or complete.
Further, it examines the interaction between sequential lending and frequent repayment, in
particular showing that there is a strong synergy between the two.
2.3 Social Capital
Besley and Coate (1995) analyze the implications of social sanctions in a group-lending context.
They find that depending on the magnitude of social capital, group-lending may, or may not
lead to greater repayment vis-a-vis individual lending. Laffont and Rey (2003) find that even
with collusion, group-lending does better vis-a-vis individual lending. Other papers examining
the issue include Aghion (1999), Bhole and Ogden (2010), Paal and Wiseman (2011) and de
Quidt et al. (2012). The empirical evidence on the efficacy of social capital in ensuring timely
repayment is mixed. In a lab experiment Abbink et al. (2006) find that groups consisting of
strangers do as well as self-selected groups. In a similar vein, Wydick (1999) using group lending
data from Guatemala finds that friends do not make better group members. In contrast, Karlan
(2007), finds that social capital is correlated with positive repayment performances.
In contrast to Besley and Coate (1995) and Aghion (1999), we explicitly allow for borrower
collusion. Also, in contrast to Laffont and Rey (2003), Bhole and Ogden (2010), Paal and
Wiseman (2011), and de Quidt et al. (2012) we analyze sequential, rather than simultaneous
lending schemes. Further, unlike Bhole and Ogden (2010) and Paal and Wiseman (2011), (i) we
do not allow for repeated interactions but instead analyze a dynamic one-off interaction, and (ii)
the magnitude of social sanctions is norm driven in our framework. We add to this literature by
analyzing how social capital interacts with sequential lending, in particular how the nature of
collusion affects repayment performance. In so doing this paper, along with Paal and Wiseman
(2011), takes a step in reconciling the mixed results found in the empirical literature.
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3 The Model
The framework is populated by a lender, namely an MFI, and a set of potential borrowers of
size n. Each borrower has a project that requires a start-up capital of k, where k is a choice
variable and can take any non-negative value. Project returns accrue over time, starting at time
0 (say), so that a project of size k yields a return of F (k) at every t ∈ [0, 1]. F (k) is increasing,
strictly concave and once differentiable in k, with F (0) = 0. Moreover, F (k) satisfies a version
of the Inada condition, with limk→∞ F ′(k) < 1. Project returns are observed by the lender.
We assume that neither the MFI, nor the borrowers discount the future and that all have
linear utility functions defined over money. Denoting the opportunity cost of 1 unit of fund
for the lender by (1 + c), where c ≥ 0, the ‘efficient’ project size k∗(c) is then obtained by
maximizing F (k)−k(1+ c). Given strict concavity of F (k), it follows that there exists a unique
value of k∗(c) that maximizes F (k) − k(1 + c). Since F (0) = 0, it follows that k∗(c) > 0 if
and only if F ′(0) > 1 + c, with F ′(k∗(c)) = 1 + c under this condition. We maintain this
assumption throughout this paper. We also note that strict concavity of F (k) implies that
F (k)− k(1 + c) > 0 for all 0 < k ≤ k∗(c).
The borrowers have no investible fund. Thus, to implement a project of size k, they must
borrow the amount k from the MFI and agree to repay the lender according to some repayment
schedule. In what follows, we assume that the lender charges an interest rate r for her loan,
r ≥ 0, so that for any project of size k, the aggregate repayment must equal k(1 + r).
As in Besley and Coate (1995), a borrower is allowed to strategically default on her repay-
ment obligation at any date t.5 In the event of such strategic default, the project is ‘liquidated’
with the borrower obtaining a private benefit of (1− t)b(k) and the lender obtaining (1− t)z(k),
where b(k), z(k) ≥ 0. Throughout, we maintain the following assumption.
A.1.
(i) b(k) is increasing and once differentiable in k, with b(0) = 0. Furthermore, for every
k > 0
F (k) > b(k) + z(k).
(ii) For all k ≥ 0, b(k)F (k) is non-decreasing in k.
A.1(i) implies that ‘liquidation’ is ex post inefficient. Our interest given A.1(i) will be to
characterize outcomes that do not involve strategic default and liquidation. As will be clear
shortly, the actual magnitude of z(k) plays no role in the ensuing analysis and henceforth, we
normalize its value to zero. A.1(ii) captures the intuitive notion that default incentives are
non-decreasing in the project size k, and will be satisfied quite generally. In particular, since
F (k) is strictly concave, b(k)F (k) will be decreasing in k if b(k) is (weakly) convex. Moreover, if
b(k) = γF (k), where 0 < γ < 1, then b(k)F (k) is a constant function of k and A.1(ii) is satisfied.
We note that the formulation of the default payoff adopted in this paper is quite general
and encompasses many different scenarios.
One interpretation is that the default payoff b(k)(1 − t) is closely tied to the physical liq-
uidation of the project, arising either directly out of liquidation by the MFI itself, or as the
benefit that the borrower can garner for herself by overusing the asset just prior to defaulting
at t (with subsequent liquidation by the lender yielding a residual benefit of (1− t)z(k) to the
lender).
5There is also a large literature on ex ante moral hazard, e.g. Banerjeeet al. (1994), Bond and Rai (2009),
and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), as well as adverse selection in micro-finance, e.g. Ghatak (1999, 2000), Laffont
and Rey (2003), Sadoulet (2000), and Rai and Sjostorm (2004), among many others.
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The default payoff however need not necessarily involve physical liquidation of assets, and
can be interpreted more broadly.6 For instance, one can assume that if the borrower wants
to default, she can hide the return F (k) from the lender. In order to do this however, the
borrower needs to incur a cost which is some fraction 1 − γ of the actual output F (k). Given
this interpretation, the default payoff to the borrower can then be written as γF (k)(1− t).7
Another possible interpretation is that, following a default, the MFI imposes some one-shot
penalty on the borrower, say p > 0. Such one shot penalties arise quite naturally, for example,
in case the MFI’s punishment strategies involve some form of social shaming. The borrower
however continues to use the project technology without any further loss of efficiency, so that
the default payoff is given by F (k)(1− t)− p.8 Default may also lead to denial of future loans,
or a defaulting borrower’s credit her tory being wiped out. While such additional penalties
would make default less attractive, and some implications of allowing for such default payoffs
are analyzed in Fischer and Ghatak (2010, 2011), a full analysis is beyond the scope of this
paper. In the rest of the paper, we thus use liquidation as a portmanteau term that allows for
all the different interpretations that can be represented via the default function b(k)(1− t).
3.1 Individual Lending
The case of individual lending forms a benchmark for the later analysis. It is also of independent
interest since, as discussed earlier, some MFIs are either moving away from group loans, or do
not impose any form of joint liability even though the loans may involve a group structure
(ASA, for example, has some group loans without group guarantees, ASA (2008)).
We visualize the following scenario: at t = 0, the MFI enters into a contract with a borrower
that specifies the amount borrowed k, and a payment scheme y(t, k), t ∈ [0, 1], where y(t, k)
is the instantaneous non-negative payment at date t. Let Y (t, k) =
∫ t
0 y(τ, k)dτ denote the
aggregate payment that the borrower makes in the time interval [0, t]. Throughout, we assume
that borrowers are protected by limited liability so that at each date t, the maximum payment
that can be made to the lender is no more than the aggregate returns that accrue till date t,
i.e. Y (t, k) ≤ tF (k) for every t. If the borrower accepts the contract, she immediately invests k
in the project and has to make payments according to the repayment schedule. If the borrower
fails to meet her payment obligations at any date t, the project is liquidated.
A repayment schedule y(t, k) is said to satisfy the no default (ND) condition if, for every
t ∈ [0, 1],
F (k)(1− t)−
∫ 1
t
y(τ, k)dτ ≥ b(k)(1− t). (1)
Given k, and y(t, k) for which the ND condition holds, the aggregate repayment received by the
lender is given by
∫ 1
0 y(t, k)dt.
For any r, a lending scheme < k, y(t, k) > is said to be r-feasible if it satisfies the ND
condition and ∫ 1
0
y(t, k)dt = k(1 + r). (2)
6We are thankful to several anonymous commentators who suggested these alternative interpretations.
7A default payoff of γF (k)(1 − t) can also arise in case the default penalty leads to some loss of efficiency,
though not physical liquidation of the assets. Such loss of efficiency can arise in case (a) default leads to some
loss of social capital following some form of public shaming, for example, public disclosure of such default, and
(b) the project payoff is itself dependent on social capital.
8While this interpretation fits less obviously into the present framework, we shall later discuss the implications
of adopting this alternative formulation of the default function under individual lending.
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Note that if r ≥ c, then equation (2) also ensures that the MFI makes non-negative profits on
its loans.
Our plan in this section, as well as the following one, is to characterize the set of r-feasible
project sizes k, taking the interest rate r as given.9 Towards that end, we first define a simple
class of contracts, where the loan amount is repaid in the shortest possible time.
Definition 1. An immediate and frequent repayment scheme (henceforth IFR) corresponding
to a project size k and an interest rate r is defined as
y(t, k) =
{
F (k), if 0 < t ≤ (1+r)kF (k) ,
0, otherwise.
(3)
Our next result, Lemma 1, is analytically extremely convenient as it shows that, in the
presence of risk neutrality and in the absence of discounting, one can, without loss of generality,
restrict attention to such IFR contracts.
Lemma 1. Under an individual lending arrangement, if a lending scheme < k, y(t, k) > is
r-feasible, then the IFR scheme corresponding to the project size k is also r-feasible.
Proof. We first observe that since the scheme < k, y(t, k) > is r-feasible, it must satisfy the
ND condition at t = 0. But at t = 0, the ND condition for any scheme is given simply by
F (k)− k(1 + r) ≥ b(k). (4)
Next we consider the IFR scheme given k and r. Under this scheme, the entire loan is repaid
by t˜, where t˜ = k(1+r)F (k) . Consider t < t˜. Since, at any such date
∫ 1
t y(τ, k)dτ = k(1 + r)−F (k)t,
the ND constraint under an IFR can be re-written, using equation (1), as
F (k)− k(1 + r) ≥ b(k)(1− t). (5)
Clearly, under an IFR, the default incentives are decreasing over time. Thus, the ND constraints
are satisfied for all t, if and only if the ND constraint at t = 0, i.e. F (k) − k(1 + r) ≥ b(k), is
satisfied, which is true given (4).
The intuition as to why one can restrict attention to IFR schemes is simple. With a frequent
repayment scheme, the installments are staggered, so that the amount to be repaid does not
become very large at any one point, in particular as the project nears completion. While default
incentives are largest at the very start of the project, i.e. at t = 0, at this point continuation
payoffs are also correspondingly higher. With any other repayment scheme, the net continuation
payoff of the borrower will be strictly lower at some point in time in the future, making default
alternative more attractive to the borrower.
We observe that Lemma 1 is consistent with Field et al (2011). It is also in line with Kurosaki
and Khan (2009), who find that while, in Pakistan, several group-lending schemes failed in the
late 1990s, there was a drastic decrease in default rates from early 2005, when contract designs
were changed and involved more frequent repayment installments (and improved enforcement
of contingent renewal).
For any k which is r-feasible, let the payoff of a borrower be denoted pi(k, r) = F (k) −
k(1 + r). Further, given r ≥ 0, let k0(r) > 0 solve pi(k0(r), r) = 0. Given our assumption that
9In Section 5, we study the optimization problem for the MFI.
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limk→∞ F ′(k) < 1, for any r ≥ 0, k0(r) is uniquely defined. Moreover, pi(k, r) > 0, if and only
if k < k0(r).
We now introduce a notion that plays an important role in the development of our results.
Definition 2. For any (k, r), with pi(k, r) > 0, define the average net default incentive,
φ(k, r) =
b(k)− pi(k, r)
pi(k, r)
=
b(k)
pi(k, r)
− 1. (6)
Note that b(k) − pi(k, r) represents the net gain from defaulting at t = 0. Thus φ(k, r)
measures the net default incentive as a proportion of the net return, pi(k, r) at t = 0. Clearly
if the average net default incentive φ(k, r) is positive, a borrower with loan size k will strictly
prefer to default at t = 0 and thus a loan of size of k that promises the MFI an aggregate
repayment of k(1 + r) cannot be sustained.
In Chowdhury et al. (2014) we prove Lemma 2 which shows that for any k1, k2, such that
0 < k2 < k1 < k
0(r), we have φ(k2, r) < φ(k1, r). Given Lemma 2, it follows that if a project of
size k > 0 is r-feasible, then a project of size k′ < k is also r-feasible. The following proposition
fully characterizes the set of project sizes that are r-feasible under individual lending.
Let kI(r) > 0 satisfy
φ(kI(r), r) = 0.
Note that φ(k, r) → ∞ as k → k0(r). Since φ(k, r) is an increasing function of k (Lemma
2), kI(r) > 0 exists if and only if limk→0 φ(k, r) < 0.10 Furthermore, Lemma 2 also ensures that
kI(r) is uniquely defined.
Proposition 1. A project of positive size k is r-feasible if and only k is not too large, i.e.
0 < k ≤ kI(r).
Proof. Now at t = 0, under an IFR, the ND constraint is satisfied if and only if k ≤ kI(r).
Since the net default payoff from the IFR contract is decreasing in time (see the proof of Lemma
1), it then follows that for a project size k to be r-feasible, it must be the case that k ≤ kI(r).
Proposition 1 thus shows that given r, kI(r) is the maximum project size that is r-feasible.
Remark 1. A.1(ii) plays an important role in Proposition 1 as it ensures that φ(k, r) is an
increasing function of k. This, in turn, ensures that the set of r-feasible project choices k is a
convex set, namely the interval [0, kI(r)]. In the absence of A.1(ii), kI(r) needs to be defined as
the supremum of all k such that φ(kI(r), r) = 0. Moreover, in such a case, it will not be true
that if k is r-feasible, then any k′ < k is also r-feasible.
Remark 2. It might be of interest to note that in this set up, an IFR scheme does strictly
better than an one shot repayment scheme in which the borrower repays the loan in a single
installment. To see this, let kIOSR(r) be the supremum of project sizes that is feasible under a
one shot contract. Let tOSR be the date the repayment is made when the project size is k
I
OSR(r).
Since the borrower prefers not to default at tOSR, we have (1− tOSR)b(kIOSR) + tOSRF (kIOSR) ≤
pi(kIOSR, r). By A.1(i), we have F (k
I
OSR) > b(k
I
OSR) and thus pi(k
I
OSR, r) > b(k
I
OSR). This gives
us φ(kIOSR, r) < 0 = φ(k
I(r), r). From Lemma 2, we then have kIOSR < k
I(r).
10If F ′(0) is finite, then limk→0 φ(k, r) < 0 iff b′(0) < F ′(0) − 1 − r, and when F ′(0) is infinite, the condition
is limk→0
b′(k)
F ′(k) < 1.
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Remark 3. It is easy to extend the present formulation to allow for any possible dynamic
incentive considerations that may arise if, in case of default, a borrower is denied loans in
the future. Letting V denote the utility loss to the borrower arising out of this possibility, it is
straightforward to see that the no default condition in such a case can be written as b(k, r)−V ≤
pi(k, r) and the maximum project size k will then satisfy φ(k, r) = Vpi(k,r) . As is clear, the presence
of such considerations will reduce the net benefit of default and will allow larger project sizes to
be r-feasible.
Remark 4. How does kI(r) compare with the efficient project size k∗(c)? It is easy to check that
a necessary and sufficient condition for kI(r) to be strictly less than k∗(c) is that φ(k∗(c), r) > 0.
This condition is likely to hold, (a) higher the value of b(k), (b) lower the value of pi(k, r) and
(c) higher the interest rate r (thus if φ(k∗(c), 0) > 0 then kI(r) < k∗(c) for all r).
Proposition 1 essentially establishes two properties of feasible repayment schedules, namely
that they involve (a) immediate and frequent repayment, as well as (b) front-loaded repayments.
At this point it may be in order to examine how these two results hold up under alternative
model specifications.
First, consider a scenario where the borrowers have strictly concave utility functions or have
positive time discount factors. Under such a scenario, an IFR scheme, in general, will fail to be
optimal. This is because alternative repayment schemes that shift some of the repayments to
later instants (while keeping aggregate repayment unchanged) will be preferred by a borrower
with diminishing marginal utility of income or who discounts the future. However, even in such
a scenario, an optimal scheme must necessarily be characterized by ‘gradual’ repayments in that
payments are made ‘a little at a time’ (Jain and Mansuri, 2003).
Next we consider the alternative default payoff function discussed earlier, where in case of
default, there is a one shot penalty of p > 0, but the borrower can continue her project without
loss of efficiency. It is possible to show that the incentive to default is decreasing over time
even under this specification. It is thus sufficient to consider default incentives at t = 0. This
gives the result that a project size of k can be sustained if and only if p ≥ k(1 + r), so that an
analogue of Proposition 1 will hold.
Proposition 1 tells us that if at r = c, kI(c) < k∗(c), then the efficient project size of k∗(c) is
not feasible under individual lending even when the lender makes zero profit. Strategic default
considerations thus have serious efficiency implications. It is then natural to ask whether group
contracts allows us to implement more ‘efficient’ project sizes. To this, we now turn.
4 Group Lending and Social Capital
We will consider group lending in the presence of dynamic joint liability. Under dynamic
joint liability, the entire group is held responsible (and penalized) in case of default: first, if
some borrowers default, then all existing projects are necessarily dissolved, and second, group
members who are yet to receive their loans are denied any future loans.
One important objective in examining group lending is to study the complex role played by
social capital in ensuring repayment (Aghion and Morduch, 2005, pp. 123-125). Without being
too formal about it, let social capital capture the strength of the social ties present among the
borrowers.11 We argue that while such social ties may help sustain sanctions against defaulting
11Townsend (1994), Udry (1990) and Fafchamps and Lund (2003), among others, discuss various aspects of
mutual insurance, risk pooling, gift giving and receiving, etc.
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borrowers,12 thus improving incentives for repayment, these can also encourage default in case
close social ties in small communities make social sanctions difficult to impose.
One positive aspect of social capital is the fact that a defaulting member may be sanctioned
by other members of the group. In the present paper such sanctions are, however, assumed to be
only imposed by those borrowers who are adversely affected following a default. These include
borrowers who are yet to obtain a loan, and may also include borrowers who have obtained a
loan, but have already repaid substantially, so that they would prefer not to default. We assume
that each such affected member can invoke a penalty of f on each of the deviating borrowers.
While we follow Besley and Coate (1995), among others, in imposing such social sanctions
exogenously, the present formulation can perhaps be best interpreted as a reduced form ap-
proximation of a model where such penalties are imposed as part of optimal threat strategies.
Such an interpretation makes sense in a scenario where social penalties involve exclusion from
scarce community assets. In such cases social sanctions may involve no loss of efficiency, and
would be easier to sustain as an equilibrium outcome. Sustaining such sanctions, however is
much harder if such sanctions are efficiency reducing, e.g. if it involves exclusion from mutual
insurance networks. In such scenarios, one then needs to appeal to social preferences, e.g. the
presence of altruistic punishers (see Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Gintis et al. (2005), and the
references therein) to sustain such sanctions.
We next discuss the negative aspects of social capital, i.e. the fact that “borrowers in a
group-lending arrangement may collude against the bank and undermine the bank’s ability to
harness social collateral” (Aghion and Morduch, 2005, pp. 125). In a micro-finance context
where borrowers communicate with one another, it seems natural to allow for some collusion.13
We argue that the observed differences in the impact of social capital on repayment performance
can be traced to differences in the extent of collusion. We thus examine two scenarios with
different degrees of collusion among the borrowers, limited and complete.
Since, under limited collusion, borrowers cannot make transfers to each other, collusion thus
simply involves not invoking the social sanction whenever all borrowers benefit from a coordi-
nated default. Under complete collusion, we however allow borrowers to make such transfers
among one another. Following Ghatak (2000), one can appeal to non-pecuniary forms of trans-
fers, e.g. providing free labor services and the use of agricultural implements, to justify such
side transfers. Furthermore, collusion is formalized very simply in that the group maximizes
the aggregate payoff and thus decisions are made keeping the interest of the group in mind.
Clearly, in case of complete collusion, social sanctions will never be imposed in case of default.14
The issue of when is collusion likely to be complete, i.e. whether side transfers are feasible,
is however a complex one and a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper.
4.1 Two Stage Lending Schemes
For the analysis in this section, we shall take the group size n to be exogenously given. In what
follows, we first study two stage group contracts in the presence of dynamic joint liability.
12Such social sanctions may involve exclusion from inputs, trade credit, social and religious events, day-to-day
courtesies, communal assets, informal insurance networks, etc. See de Quidt et al. (2012) for a discussion of
possible alternative formulations of social capital.
13One extreme example of such borrower collusion is from India where a woman defrauded MFIs to the tune
of five hundred thousand rupees by setting up groups with the sole objective of appropriating the loan amount
(Srinivasan, 2009).
14In the Grameen, for example, there seems to be some effort at fostering a group identity. At least
three of the resolutions (12, 13 and 14), emphasize group payoff and joint welfare maximization. Source:
http://www.grameen-info.org, accessed May 7, 2009.
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In two-stage group lending arrangements, the set of borrowers are divided into two groups,
1 and 2. The first group of borrowers, (n−m) in size, receives a loan of k each at t1 = 0, while
the remaining m borrowers receive k each at some later date t2 > 0.
Let yi(ti + τ, k), τ ∈ [0, 1], denote a repayment schedule faced by a borrower in group i, i =
1, 2, receiving her loan k at date ti. We represent such a scheme by < n,m, t2, k, yi(tiτ, k) >.
As before, we assume that there is limited liability on part of the borrowers so that the
repayment obligations at any date can not exceed the aggregate returns generated till that date.
We will further assume that the lender gets the same payoff from each individual loan, thus
ruling out cross-subsidization by the lender. Finally, we assume that yi(ti + τ, k) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2
for all τ ∈ [0, 1].
4.2 Two Stage Lending Schemes without Side Payments
In this sub-section we examine a scenario where side transfers are not possible, so that only
‘limited collusion’ can be sustained.
Fix any two stage lending scheme with repayment obligations given by yi(ti+τ, k). Let P i(t)
denote the continuation payoff to a borrower in group i at time t, assuming that no member of
the group ever defaults on her loan. Similarly, given a default at t, let Di(t) denote the default
payoff of a borrower in group i at t, gross of social sanctions. Since default by any member
leads to the liquidation of all existing projects, as well as denial of future loans, it follows that
Di(t) depends only on t and not on either the number, or the identity of those who default.
A borrower is said to be active at t, if she is yet to complete her project at that date. We
assume that social sanctions at any date t are imposed only by the members that are active at
that date. Let L(t) denote the set of active borrower at t for whom P i(t) ≥ Di(t). The members
of L(t) are those who are adversely affected if default were to take place at t. Our assumption
of limited collusion requires that a defaulting member be sanctioned only by the members of
L(t), i.e. by those who are adversely affected because of a default. Let l(t) denote the size of
L(t) and f > 0 denote the social sanction that can be imposed on a defaulting borrower.15
A two stage lending scheme < n,m, t2, k, yi(ti + τ, k) > satisfies the no default condition if,
for all t ∈ [0, 1 + t2], and for an active borrower in group i, i = 1, 2,
Di(t) > P i(t) implies that Di(t)− l(t)f ≤ P i(t). (7)
We should note that if Di(t) ≤ P i(t), then a borrower in group i will prefer not to de-
fault even if no social sanctions are imposed on her and thus the no default condition will be
automatically satisfied for such a borrower.
We say that a two-stage group arrangement with project size k is r-feasible if there exists a
repayment scheme < yi(ti + τ, k) > such that
• the no default condition in (7) is satisfied for all borrowers in group i = 1, 2, and
• for each borrower, the lender receives a payoff of k(1 + r).
Given r ≥ c, the last condition ensures that the MFI breaks even.
Remark 5. Consider a group lending scheme with simultaneous lending, so that group members
are all provided a loan amount k at t1 = 0. If k > kI(r), then b(k) > pi(k, r) and thus all
15In an earlier version, L(t) was defined as the set of borrowers who are strictly worse off because of a default
decision. While the qualitative results under these two assumptions are virtually identical, under the present
formulation, the set of feasible projects turns out to be a closed set, a property that will be used in the analysis
in Section 5.
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borrowers will be better off defaulting on their loans and not invoking the social sanctions.
Simultaneous group lending thus can not improve upon individual lending. For group lending to
do better, lending then has to be sequential so that t2 > 0.
To characterize the set of project sizes k that are r-feasible under such a two stage arrange-
ment, we begin by describing the immediate and frequent repayment (IFR) pertaining to each
group. For any borrower i who receives a loan of size k at date ti, this is given by
yi(ti + τ, k) =
{
F (k), if 0 < τ ≤ k(1+r)F (k) ,
0, otherwise.
(8)
Lemma 3 below shows that in search of a feasible scheme, it is sufficient to restrict attention
to IFR schemes (see Chowdhury et el. (2014), Appendix B, for a proof).
Lemma 3 Fix k > 0 such that pi(k, r) > 0. Suppose that project size k is r-feasible under
limited collusion with a two stage group lending arrangement. Then, k is r-feasible in a two
stage group lending arrangement in which the lender uses only IFR contracts.
Lemma 3, together with Remark 5, establishes that a combination of sequential lending with
IFR is the interesting class of institutions to examine.
Let kL(r) satisfy
φ(kL(r), r) = 1.
If kI(r) > 0, then it follows that kL(r) is uniquely defined (this is because of Lemma 2 and
the fact that as k increases to k0(r) > 0, where recall that pi(k0(r), r) = 0, φ(k0(r), r) goes to
infinity.) Furthermore, kL(r) > kI(r).
We now show that a necessary condition for a project size k to be r-feasible, is that k can
not be more than kL(r).
First, note that in an IFR scheme, the default payoff for each borrower is decreasing in time.
Thus, for the feasibility of such a scheme, it is sufficient to check the default incentives of the
borrowers at exactly three dates: t = {0, t2, 1}.
Now at t = 0, if there is a default, this will adversely affect the remaining m members as
they would be denied any future loan. These borrowers will thus impose a penalty f on any
defaulting members. Thus, the maximum payoff that a defaulting member gets at t = 0 is
b(k) −mf . The continuation payoff for a borrower, however, is pi(k, r). Thus, the no default
condition at t = 0 is
b(k)−mf ≤ pi(k, r). (9)
Now consider the date t2 at which the remaining m borrowers receive their loans. Since
k > kI(r), for the second group of members not to default, the first group of borrowers must
impose the social sanction. Thus, as in (9), we must also have
b(k)− (n−m)f ≤ pi(k, r). (10)
Now for group 2 borrowers to be sanctioned by the first group, default at t2 must adversely
affect the borrowers in that group. Since the continuation payoff of the first group of borrowers
at any date is at most pi(k, r), it follows that at t2, for group 1 members to impose the sanction,
a necessary condition is
b(k)(1− t2) ≤ pi(k, r). (11)
Finally, at t = 1, since the first group of borrowers would have completed their projects, no
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further sanctions will be forthcoming from this group. Thus, at t = 1, the no default condition
for a borrower in the second group is simply
b(k)t2 ≤ pi(k, r). (12)
Adding equations (11) and (12), one obtains b(k) ≤ 2pi(k, r) as a necessary condition for k
to be r-feasible. This is equivalent to φ(k, r) ≤ 1, i.e. k ≤ kL(r), thus establishing the claim.
It may be of interest to observe that kL(r) is independent of the magnitude of either f , or n.
Thus, no matter how large either f or n is, project size larger than kL(r) can not be r-feasible.
The next proposition establishes sufficient conditions on f and n for which project size kL(r)
is in fact r-feasible.
Proposition 2. Assume that b(kL(r))−pi(kL(r), r) ≤ nf2 .16 Then, under limited collusion and
a two stage sequential lending scheme, a project of size k is r-feasible if and only if k ≤ kL(r).
Before we turn to proving this result, a couple of remarks might be useful.
Remark 6. Since for any f > 0 (no matter how small), it is always possible to choose n large
enough such that the condition in Proposition 2 is satisfied, it follows that the conclusion of
Proposition 2 holds as long as the choice of n is unrestricted for the MFI.
Remark 7. It is of interest to examine the maximum r-feasible project size when nf is small,
so that b(kL(r))− pi(kL(r), r) > nf2 . It is straightforward to argue that the maximum r-feasible
project size in that case is given by the maximum kˆ for which b(kˆ)− pi(kˆ, r) = nf2 .
Proof of Proposition 2. Necessity is already proved. To prove sufficiency, recall that nf2 ≥
[b(kL(r)) − pi(kL(r), r)]. Consider any k > 0 such that φ(k, r) ≤ 1. We will show that there
exists a two stage procedure under which k is r-feasible. The interesting case to consider is
when k > kI(r), since for k ≤ kI(r), we can always choose a trivial two-stage group where all
borrowers obtain their loans at the same time.
Let t2 ∈ (0, 1) satisfy
t2b(k) = pi(k, r). (13)
Since k > kI(r), it follows that b(k) > pi(k, r) and thus (13) has a unique solution t2 ∈ (0, 1).
Consider now a two stage procedure in which half of the n borrowers receive their loan at
t = 0, half at t2, and every borrower has a repayment obligation given by the IFR corresponding
to (k, r). Since nf2 ≥ [b(kL(r))−pi(kL(r), r)], and b(k)−pi(k, r) is increasing in k, it follows that
at k ≤ kL(r), equations (9) and (10) will both be satisfied as long as a defaulting member faces
a sanction of nf2 .
Now, in the event of any default at t = 0, sanctions will be imposed by the members who
are yet to get get their loan as they will be adversely affected. Given (9), none of the borrowers
receiving their loans at t = 0 is thus going to default.
Next consider t = t2. We show that default at this date by any member in the second group
must adversely affect all members in the first group who obtained their loan at t = 0.
Case (i). t2 ≥ k(1+r)F (k) : In this case, at t2, the first set of borrowers would have already repaid
their loans, and therefore, their continuation payoff at this date equals F (k)(1 − t2), which is
strictly greater than b(k)(1− t2).
16Strictly speaking, this condition assumes that n is even. When n is odd, Proposition 2 holds whenever
b(k)− pi(k, r) ≤ (n−1)f
2
. In the sufficiency part, we then take the two sub-groups to be of size n− 1, and n+ 1.
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Case (ii). t2 < k(1+r)F (k) : In this case, the continuation no default payoff to any such borrower
at t2 is exactly pi(k, r). Now the default payoff at t2 equals b(k)(1− t2) which, by equation (13),
equals b(k) − pi(k, r). Since φ(k, r) = b(k)pi(k,r) − 1 ≤ 1, it follows that b(k) − pi(k, r) ≤ pi(k, r).
Thus, default at t2 will adversely affect the first set of borrowers.
Thus in either case a default by any member of the second group adversely affects all
members in the first group, and a defaulting borrower at this date will attract a social penalty
of f from all n/2 borrowers in the first group. Thus, a group 2 member will not default at t2.
Finally, consider t = 1. If at this date, the second group has already repaid their loans, then
their continuation payoff is F (k)t2, which is strictly greater than b(k)t2. On the other hand, if
at t = 1, the second set of borrowers are yet to repay, then the continuation no default payoff
to a borrower in this group is pi(k, r), while by defaulting she obtains b(k)t2. Using (13), it then
follows that a borrower can not be strictly better off by defaulting.
Remark 8. As in the individual lending scheme, a sequential joint liability scheme does strictly
better when coupled with IFR, rather than with an one shot repayment scheme (Chowdhury et
al. (2014)).
We end this section with a brief discussion of the role played by some of the assumptions
made earlier in Proposition 2, namely that repayments are non-negative, that cross-subsidizing
is not allowed and that dynamic joint liability holds.
In case negative repayments are possible (so that the MFI may pay the borrower), one can
show that any project size that yields a strictly positive payoff to a borrower is feasible using
schemes in which every borrower pays the MFI an amount F (k) at every instant the project is
active. When all borrowers have completed their projects, the MFI then returns the amount
F (k) − k(1 + r) to each of the borrowers (the proof is available on request). Such a scheme
however is problematic on several counts, e.g. since it requires the MFI to credibly commit to
returning the amount due to the borrowers. Such schemes would also be ruled out in case there
is free entry by the MFIs. This is because such schemes would require higher repayments by
the borrowers at some point of time. But at such points they may be lured away by competing
MFIs, causing such schemes to unravel.
Proposition 2 also depends on the assumption that the lender is not allowed to cross-
subsidize. Otherwise one can sustain a project size k > kL, where both the borrowers obtain
their loan simultaneously, but are required to repay different amounts. Then the borrower with
the smaller repayment obligation may have little incentive to default herself and will therefore
impose the social sanction in case of default by the other borrower. Now if the social sanction f
is large, then this threat will ensure that the other borrower does not default either. Of course,
since such schemes treat borrowers asymmetrically, such contracts might be unacceptable to
the borrowers. Further, in the presence of free entry by MFIs, such schemes would unravel as
the borrowers with higher repayment obligations may be lured away by other MFIs.
Finally, note that in our framework, there is dynamic joint liability so that once any group
member defaults, all projects are dissolved. Such a scheme would then be ex post inefficient
if default were to take place in equilibrium. However, given the current set up (with no uncer-
tainties in production), no borrower defaults along an equilibrium and therefore, the outcome
is efficient ex ante, as well as ex post.
More importantly however, it can be shown that weaker forms of dynamic joint liability
suffices for our analysis. Consider default at time t by some borrower j, leading to borrower
j’s project being liquidated. Consider now a non-defaulting borrower. For such a borrower,
assume instead a weaker form of joint liability under which such a borrower is allowed to
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continue with her project, but is subject to some penalty, e.g. that arising out of static joint
liability (whereby non-defaulters are supposed to repay for the defaulters also). As long as the
resultant continuation payoff is assumed to be less than the continuation payoff of this borrower
in case there was no default, such a borrower will impose the social sanction on the defaulting
borrower and Proposition 2 will continue to hold.
4.3 Two Stage Group Lending Schemes with Side Payments
We next study group lending schemes under ‘complete collusion’ that allows for side transfers
among borrowers. We model this situation simply, by taking the group as a single entity that
decides on its default decision, so as to maximize the aggregate group payoff.
The possibility of such side transfers have two opposing effects on the repayment incentives.
On one hand, since the group acts as a single entity, it follows that social sanctions will never
be invoked in this case. This effect, which is in line with Aghion and Morduch (2005, pp. 125),
tends to increase default incentives. On the other hand, if the group decides to default early, it
takes into account the possible loss such default will inflict on the members who will be denied
loans in the future. This effect will then dampen default incentives of the group. Interestingly,
however, we show that when n is large such that the condition in Proposition 2 holds, the first
effect always dominates and the maximum loan size that is feasible under complete collusion, is
strictly less than kL(r). Even in this case, however, group lending schemes allow one to sustain
higher loan sizes compared to that under individual lending.
As earlier, we denote a two-stage scheme by< n,m, t2, k, yi(ti+τ, k) > in which yi(ti+τ, k) ≥
0 for τ ∈ [0, 1] and i = 1, 2. Since side transfers are possible, to check for default incentives at
any time t, one needs to compare the aggregate default payoff of the group and compare it with
the non-default continuation payoff for the entire group. Since the social sanction will never be
imposed by the group, the magnitude of f does not have any effect on the repayment behavior
of the group.
Given < n,m, t2, k, yi(ti + τ, k) >, let PG(t) denote the aggregate continuation payoff of the
group assuming the group never defaults on its repayment obligations and DG(t) denote the
group’s aggregate default payoff at t.
A two-stage group arrangement < n,m, t2, k, yi(ti + τ, k) > is said to be r-feasible if for all
t ∈ [0, 1 + t2],
• PG(t) ≥ DG(t), and
• ∫ 1τ=0 yi(ti + τ, k)dτ = k(1 + r) for i = 1, 2.
In such a case, we say that a project size k is r-feasible under a two stage procedure with
side transfers.
As in Lemma 3, it can be shown that in our search for an optimal two stage group lending
arrangement, it is sufficient to restrict attention to IFR schemes.17
Given such a two stage scheme, to check for the no default conditions for the group, consider
t = 0, when the first group of borrowers, numbering n−m, receive their loans. If they default,
the group will have an aggregate payoff of (n −m)b(k) and thus the group will not default at
t = 0 if
(n−m)b(k) ≤ npi(k, r). (14)
Consider now the date t2 at which the remaining m borrowers receive their loans. Now if the
group plans to default at this date, the net payoff is given by (n−m)b(k)(1−t2)+mb(k), whereas
17The proof is available upon request.
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the maximal possible continuation payoff at t2 in case of no default is npi(k, r). A necessary
condition for default to be unprofitable at t2 is then (n − m)b(k)(1 − t2) + mb(k) ≤ npi(k, r)
which can be re-written as
nb(k)− t2(n−m)b(k) ≤ npi(k, r). (15)
Dividing both sides of the preceding inequality by npi(k, r) and recalling that φ(k, r) =
b(k)
pi(k,r) − 1, we find, after rearranging terms that φ(k, r) ≤ t
2(n−m)b(k)
npi(k,r) . Whereas from (14) it
follows that (n−m)b(k)npi(k,r) ≤ 1. Combining the preceding two inequalities, it then follows that
φ(k, r) ≤ t
2(n−m)b(k)
npi(k, r)
≤ t2. (16)
Finally, at t = 1, the default payoff is mb(k)t2, while the maximum continuation payoff for
these m borrowers is at most mpi(k, r). For default to be non-profitable at date t = 1, it is
therefore necessary that
t2 ≤ pi(k, r)
b(k)
. (17)
Equations (16) and (17) thus imply that for feasibility of a scheme, t2 should neither be
too late (otherwise default incentives at t = 1 are too large), nor too early (otherwise default
incentives at t = t2 are too large).
We now provide a set of necessary conditions for a project size k to be r-feasible.
Let k1(r) and k2(r) satisfy
φ(k1(r), r) =
pi(k1(r), r)
b(k1(r))
; and φ(k2(r), r) =
k2(r)(1 + r)
F (k2(r))
,
respectively. We need Lemma 4 below (the proof is in Chowdhury et al. (2014)):
Lemma 4 Under A.1, we have
(a) k ≤ k1(r) if and only if φ(k, r) ≤ φ(k,r)b(k) , and
(b) k ≤ k2(r) if and only if φ(k, r) ≤ k(1+r)F (k) .
Given Lemma 4, it then follows that k1(r) and k2(r) are well defined. Further, Lemma 4
also establishes that kC(r), defined as solving
kC(r) = min{k1(r), k2(r)},
is well defined and satisfy φ(k, r) ≤ min{pi(k,r)b(k) , k(1+r)F (k) } if and only if k ≤ kC(r).
Proposition 3 below shows that for any n, if a project of size k is r-feasible, then k ≤ kC(r).
The converse, however, does not necessarily hold. The difficulty arises because with n being
a fixed integer and φ(k, r) taking values in a continuum, it may not be possible to satisfy the
default constraints at all the dates using only finitely many group compositions.18 On the other
hand, if the choice of n was unrestricted, one can prove
Proposition 3. (a) [Necessity.] If a project of size k is r-feasible, then the project size k
cannot be too large, i.e. k ≤ kC(r).
18If one is willing to ignore the integer issue and treat n as a continuous variable, then it is easy to modify the
present proof of Proposition 3 and show that for any n, a project size k is r-feasible if and only if k ≤ kC(r).
16
(b) [Sufficiency.] If for a project of size k it is the case that k < kC(r),19 then there exists
a group size n and a group lending arrangement < n,m, t2 > with immediate and frequent
repayment for which a project of size k is r-feasible.
Proof. Please see Chowdhury et al. (2014).
Remark 9. Interestingly, for the complete collusion case, it is not necessarily the case that for
every parameter configuration, the maximum r-feasible project size using a one shot repayment
is strictly less than kC(r) (Chowdhury et al., 2014, provides an example that demonstrates this).
We now use Propositions 1, 2 and 3, to compare the maximal loan size that can be sustained
under various lending schemes and various scenarios. Recalling that kI(r) (respectively kL(r))
is the maximum loan size that is r-feasible under individual lending (respectively two-stage
lending with limited collusion), we have
Proposition 4. kL(r) ≥ kC(r) ≥ kI(r), with both inequalities being strict whenever kI(r) > 0.
Proof. Suppose that kI(r) > 0, then kI(r) is given by φ(kI(r), r) = 0. Moreover, since
φ(kC(r), r) > 0 and φ(k, r) is increasing in k, we have kC(r) > kI(r). From the definition
of kC(r) , we have φ(kC(r), r) ≤ kC(r)(1+kC(r))
F (kC(r))
< 1 = φ(kL(r), r) and thus by Lemma 2,
kC(r) < kL(r).
One interesting implication of the fact that kC(r) < kL(r), is that if nf2 is large enough so
that Proposition 2 holds, then larger loan sizes can be sustained under group lending in case
collusion is limited, a result that is consistent with Abbink et. al. (2006), Wydick (1999), Gine
and Karlan (2014) and Ahlin and Townsend (2007), who find that the extent of default increases
as cooperation among group members increase.
The intuition of this result is not straightforward as there are two countervailing forces at
work here. First, the fact that social sanctions have no bite under complete collusion, makes
loans harder to recover, the fact that default decisions take group payoffs into account, makes
loans easier to recover. Which effect should dominate? Given any f > 0, if n is large enough,
then aggregate social sanction can be made large enough to control default incentives under
limited collusion. Since social penalties have no bite in the case of complete collusion, it then
follows that a larger project size is r-feasible under limited collusion. On the other hand, if n
or f are small, then aggregate social sanctioning has a very limited role in constraining default
under limited collusion. Thus, in this case the first effect is negligible, so that a higher project
size will be feasible under the complete collusion case.
4.4 Sequential Lending and IFR: An Interactive Effect
This subsection demonstrates that a scheme involving both sequential group lending and IFR
amounts to more than the sum of its parts (i.e. IFR and sequential group lending), in the sense
that the interaction between the two generates significant synergies in terms of the maximal
r-feasible project size k.
Consider a situation where 1 + b′(0) ≥ F ′(0) and b′(0) ≥ 1. Since, ∀k, F (k) − k ≤ b(k), it
follows that F (k)− k(1 + r) ≤ b(k), i.e. kI(r) = 0. It then follows from Proposition 1 that for
19It might be of some interest to note that while kC(r) satisfies the necessary condition for feasibility, it is not
possible to construct a two stage feasible arrangement if φ(kC(r)) is an irrational number (see the proof of the
Proposition 3).
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every r ≥ 0, no positive positive project size is r-feasible under individual lending with IFR.
Next consider group lending with one shot repayment. Since limk→0 F ′(k) = limk→0
F (k)
k ≤ 2,
by strict concavity, F (k)k < 2 for k > 0. Whereas by mimicking the argument in Remark 8 in
Chowdhury et al. (2014), it can be shown that irrespective of whether collusion is limited, or
complete, for any k to be feasible, it must be the case that F (k)k(1+r) ≥ 2, so that F (k)k ≥ 2. Thus
no positive project size is r-feasible under either limited or complete collusion using one shot
repayment contracts.
Consider now group lending using IFR. It can be shown that even under these conditions,
a combination of these two can not only sustain a strictly positive project size, but possibly
even the efficient one (see Propositions 2 and 3 for sufficient conditions). In Chowdhury et al.
(2014) we also provide an example demonstrating this point. Thus, there exists a broad range of
parameter values for which neither IFR, nor sequential lending can sustain any positive project
size by themselves, but a combination can sustain strictly positive amounts, thus establishing
the existence of an interactive effect.
Thus this interactive effect not only provides a justification for considering a framework
with both IFR and sequential group lending, but further an explanation as to why, in reality,
these two schemes often go together (in particular in case of those MFIs following the Grameen
I mechanism). Moreover, this result has significant implications for empirical analysis as it
suggests that any empirical work that examines either IFR or sequential lending in isolation,
may significantly underestimate the power of sequential lending when combined with IFR.
4.5 Multi-stage Group Lending Schemes
So far, our analysis has focussed on the situation where the lender is restricted to use group
lending schemes with a limited number of stages, in particular schemes with two stages. While
this appears to be a reasonable assumption empirically, it is of some interest to analyze how our
results would be modified if the lender could use a group lending scheme with any number of
stages. An earlier version of this paper had a detailed analysis of this issue. For completeness,
we report only the main findings here (the exact statements and proofs are available on request).
First, in the case of limited collusion, we demonstrated that for any f > 0, and (k, r) such
that pi(k, r) > 0, one can always choose n large enough and a group lending scheme with S
stages, S ≥ 2, in which the project size k is r-feasible, demonstrating the power of sequential
lending. The role of sequentiality is critical here, as the multi-stage nature of the scheme ensures
that by the time the penultimate group of borrowers complete their projects, the final group
of borrowers would be nearing the end of their own projects, and would have no incentive to
default. Moreover, we find that the corresponding repayment scheme need not be too protracted.
However, in an environment of complete collusion, the result is strikingly different. Indeed, we
showed that for any given (k, r), if a project size k is r-feasible, then it must be that φ(k, r) is
no more than 2. This result thus strengthens our intuition that complete collusion may have
serious efficiency costs, even when rather complex schemes are allowed for.
We end this section by pointing out a connection between the group liability contract under
complete collusion, and the contract under a scenario where there is only one single borrower
who can, however, undertake more than one possible project.20 Assume that there are n projects
of the type that we have considered so far. Then, using our earlier analysis, it follows that if the
MFI funds all the n projects at t = 0, then because of the incentive constraints, each project
can be funded up to at most kI(r), i.e. the maximal r-feasible level under individual lending.
20We thank Maitreesh Ghatak and an anonymous commentator for bringing this point to our attention.
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The lender, however, can improve matters by financing only n−m of the projects at t = 0, and
fund the remaining m projects at some appropriate date later on, provided the borrower does
not default on any of the existing projects. It is clear that this situation is isomorphic to the
situation of group lending with complete collusion and thus from Proposition 3, such staggered
financing will enable larger k to be r-feasible for each of these projects.
5 Endogenous Choice of r, k,the Number of Borrowers, Group
Composition, and Lending Schemes
In this section, we endogenously solve for several variables of interest, including the decision
regarding whether to opt for individual, or group lending.21 We therefore consider a scenario
where, under individual lending, the MFI decides on (i) the common loan size k for each of the
borrowers, (iii) the common rate of interest r on each loan, and (iii) N , the number of borrowers
that it wants to lend to. Further, in case of a group lending arrangement, the lender also has
to decide on the number of groups, say m, as well as the size of each group, call it n, so that
the total number of borrowers lent to, M = mn.
The objective behind developing this framework is to then use it to analyze several questions
of interest and possible policy relevance in the next section. To keep the analysis tractable and
simple, when considering the group lending regime, we will only consider a scenario with limited
collusion. The task of characterizing the optimal contract in the case of complete collusion turns
out to be significantly more complicated.
In what follows, we allow for the possibility that the MFI is socially motivated, i.e. it cares
for its borrowers, which is, as discussed earlier, a natural assumption in this context. The overall
payoff of the MFI from lending to a single borrower, denoted W (k, r; c, β) = (r− c)k+βpi(k, r),
puts some weight on the borrower’s payoff pi(k, r), where this weight is captured by β ∈ [0, 1).
For β = 0, we have a profit-maximizing MFI.
The following assumption will be maintained in the rest of the analysis.
A.2. F (k)− µb(k), is strictly concave in k, for all µ ∈ [0, 1].
Note that A.2 is satisfied whenever either b(k) is convex, or b(k) = γF (k), γ ∈ (0, 1).
For ease of exposition, we begin by fixing N under individual lending, as well as n and m
under group-lending, and then characterize the optimal choices of (k, r) under both regimes.
These results are then used to develop a framework in which one can endogenously solve for
n,m and N .
5.1 Individual Lending
Consider the MFI’s optimization problem given the total number of borrowers, N . Since all
borrowers are identical, the optimization problem of the MFI simplifies to maximizing the per
borrower payoff, i.e.
max
k,r
W (k, r; c, β) = [(r − c)k + βpi(k, r)],
subject to the no default constraint
0 ≥ φ(k, r),
21We are grateful to Maitreesh Ghatak of this journal and to an anonymous commentator who suggested that
we study these questions.
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obtained from Proposition 1.22
It is easy to check that at the optimal solution, denoted (kI , rI), the no default constraint
for a borrower must bind. Otherwise φ(kI , rI) > 0. Next since β < 1, by increasing the interest
rate slightly the MFI can increase its overall payoff, while ensuring that the ND constraint is
satisfied. Thus given φ(kI , rI) = 0, it follows that rkI = F (kI) − kI − b(kI). Substituting this
into W (k, r; c, β), one can rewrite the per borrower payoff to the lender as
F (kI)− kI(1 + c)− (1− β)b(kI).
The choice of kI then solves
23
F ′(kI)− (1− β)b′(kI) = 1 + c. (18)
Finally, rI is given from the equation that φ(kI , rI) = 0, so that
rI =
F (kI)
kI
− 1− b(kI)
kI
.
Note that (kI , rI) is independent of N . Further, relating these choices to Proposition 1, we find
that kI = k
I(rI), i.e. the MFI selects the maximal rI -feasible project size if (i) r is set equal to
rI and (ii) the no default condition binds.
Let WI = W (kI , rI ; c, β) denote the per borrower payoff of the MFI evaluated at the optimal
individual lending contract.
5.2 Group Lending with Limited Collusion
Assume now that the MFI decides to lend to a group consisting of n borrowers with limited
collusion possibilities. Then, to maximize per borrower MFI payoff W (k, r; c, β), the lender will
choose (kg, rg) to maximize
W (k, r; c, β) = [(r − c)k + βpi(k, r)],
subject to the no default constraint obtained from Proposition 2, i.e.
1 ≥ φ(k, r).
We shall focus on the case where
ngf
2 ≥ b(kg)− pi(kg, rg), thus ensuring that kg is r-feasible.24
As before, the no default constraint binds at the optimum. Thus the choice of (kg, rg)
satisfies φ(kg, rg) = 1, which yields
b(kg)
pi(kg ,rg)
= 2. Using this condition, one can rewrite the per
borrower objective function of the lender as
F (kg)− kg(1 + c)− (1− β)b(kg)
2
.
22It is possible that at the optimum, the per borrower profit of the MFI, i.e. (r − c)k, could be negative. To
ensure that the MFI makes a non-negative profit for each borrower, one can introduce an additional constraint,
namely (r − c)k ≥ 0, in the MFI’s optimization problem. This will not qualitatively affect any of our results.
23The second order condition is satisfied since for all k, F ′′(k)− (1− β)b′′(k) < 0 (from (A.2)).
24In Remark 10 of Chowdhury et al., 2014, we discuss how our results change if
ngf
2
< b(kg) − pi(kg, rg), so
that Proposition 2 does not apply.
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The optimal kg is then obtained from
F ′(kg)− (1− β)b
′(kg)
2
= 1 + c, (19)
and rg can be solved using the fact that φ(kg, rg) = 1, or that
rg =
F (kg)
kg
− 1− b(kg)
2kg
.
Note that (kg, rg) do not depend on either the number of groups, or on group composition, as
long as the condition
ngf
2 ≥ b(kg)− pi(kg, rg) is satisfied. Further, comparing the outcome with
Proposition 2, we find that kg = k
L(rg), i.e. the MFI selects the maximal rg-feasible project
size.
Let Wg = W (kg, rg; c, β) denote the per borrower payoff of the MFI evaluated at the optimal
group lending contract with limited collusion.
5.3 Comparing Project Size and Per Borrower Payoff under the Two Regimes
We first observe that kg > kI .
25 If not, then from equation (19), we have
0 = F ′(kg)− (1 + c)− (1− β)b
′(kg)
2
> F ′(kg)− (1 + c)− (1− β)b′(kg)
≥ F ′(kI)− (1 + c)− (1− β)b′(kI)
where the first inequality follows as b′(k) > 0, and the second inequality follows as we have
assumed that kI ≥ kg and F ′′(k) − (1 − β)b′′(k) < 0 (from A.2). This, however contradicts
equation (18).
Second, note that the per borrower payoff of the MFI is higher under group-lending, i.e.
Wg > WI . Note that Wg ≥ WI since (kI , rI) satisfies the no default condition under group-
lending, so that (kI , rI) is feasible under the group lending regime as well. The strict inequality
follows since the optimal choice has kg > kI .
How does the payoffs of the borrower compare under these two arrangements? Since
φ(kI , rI) = 0, it follows that under the individual lending regime, the payoff to the borrower
pi(kI , rI) equals b(kI). On the other hand, since φ(kg, rg) = 1 under the optimal group lending
contract, the payoff to the borrower pi(kg, rg) equals
b(kg)
2 . Thus, even though kg > kI , the bor-
rower’s payoff in the group lending contract need not be higher than that under the individual
contract. Intuitively, a relaxation of the no default constraint under group lending improves the
lender’s options. This not only allows it to increase project size, but also possibly ask for higher
interests. Depending on which effect dominates, the borrower’s payoff may either increase, or
decrease. In fact in Chowdhury et al. (2014) we provide an numerical example that explicitly
solves for the optimal (k, r) under both scenarios, showing that depending on the parameter
values, a group lending arrangement could provide the borrower with a lower payoff.
5.4 Optimal Choice of Lending Regime
In this sub-section, we develop a framework which not only endogenizes the choice of n,m and
N , but moreover compares the relative profitability of these two regimes for the MFI.
25Without further restrictions on F (k) and b(k), one cannot compare the optimal choices of rg and rI .
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To this end, we posit costs involved in lending to the borrowers. Under individual lending
with N borrowers, the lending cost is denoted C(N). This cost is transactional and arises
in the process of disbursement of loans, as well as the collection of the interest payments.
Under sequential lending, there is an additional cost arising out of the fact that with loans
being staggered, there would be diseconomies of scale. Further, the longer overall repayment
period in this case adds to coordination costs since additional meetings have to be held, and
the MFI has to deal with borrowers at different phases of project maturity. Furthermore, it is
conceivable (although we do not model it here) that some unanticipated exogenous shocks may
force a borrower to default involuntary. Under a group arrangement, such shocks will then lead
to other projects being liquidated and/or social sanctions being invoked, thus increasing the
overall cost of group lending. In general, then, one will expect group lending arrangements to
have an additional cost component that depends on n, the number of borrowers in each group.
We denote this component of the cost as λG(n), λ > 0, so that with m groups this cost becomes
λmG(n). Thus the total costs under group lending is C(mn)+λmG(n). We assume that C(N)
and G(n) are increasing and convex in their respective arguments, with C(0) = G(0) = 0.
We first consider the decision problem of the lender under individual lending. As argued in
sub-section 5.1 earlier, for every borrower the MFI lends to, the optimal contract is (kI , rI) and
the optimal per borrower payoff is WI . With N borrowers, the net payoff of the MFI is
NWI − C(N).
Let N∗I denote the optimal number of borrowers under individual lending.
Under the group lending regime, the per borrower payoff to the lender from a group equals
Wg. Therefore the total net payoff of the MFI when it lends to m groups, with each group
containing n borrowers, is given by
nmWg − C(mn)−mλG(n).
Let n∗ be the minimum even integer for which the no default condition holds, i.e. n
∗f
2 ≥ b(kg)−
pi(kg, rg). Since the lender’s maximand can equivalently be written as mn[Wg − C(mn)mn − λG(n)n ],
it follows that at the optimal choice of m and n, n must equal n∗. The optimization problem
for the lender thus reduces to choosing an m so as to maximize
mn∗Wg − C(mn∗)−mλG(n∗).
Let (m∗, n∗) denote the optimal choice under the group lending scheme.
We now provide a simple condition that determines whether the lender prefers group or
individual lending. Let λ∗ satisfy
Wg −WI = λ
∗G(n∗)
n∗
. (20)
Given that Wg > WI , λ
∗ as defined in (20) is unique and strictly positive. We now argue that
the MFI prefers individual lending to group lending if and only if λ > λ∗.
First consider the case where λ > λ∗. If the lender uses the individual lending program
and lends to m∗n∗ borrowers, its net profit would have been m∗n∗WI − C(m∗n∗). Note that
this payoff exceeds that from group lending if and only if m∗n∗WI − C(m∗n∗) > m∗n∗Wg −
C(m∗n∗)−m∗λG(n∗), i.e. Wg −WI < λG(n
∗)
n∗ , which is true given that λ > λ
∗.
Next consider the case where λ < λ∗. Let m be defined as N
∗
I
n∗ , and consider a group lending
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regime where the lender lends to m groups, each containing n∗ lenders. Since λ < λ∗, a similar
argument as above establishes that group lending will be the preferred choice for the MFI.26
Finally, note that under the group lending the marginal net benefit per borrower is simply
given by Wg− λG(n
∗)
n∗ while the marginal net benefit per borrower is WI . Thus, ignoring integer
constraint on the choice of the borrowers, it follows that the total number of borrowers under
the group lending scheme mn∗ is strictly greater than N∗I if and only if λ < λ
∗. We summarize
the above discussions in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Consider the MFI’s choice over both the lending regimes, individual versus
group lending with limited collusion.
(i) The optimal project size is larger under group-lending, i.e. kg > kI .
(ii) A borrower’s payoff under group lending is strictly greater than that under individual lend-
ing if and only if b(kI) <
b(kg)
2 .
(iii) The MFI prefers the individual lending regime to the group lending regime if and only if
λ > λ∗, where λ∗ solves equation (20).
(iv) Outreach is higher under a group-lending mechanism if and only if the MFI prefers group-
lending to individual lending.
Note that this paper is one of the very few in the literature to compare the outcomes, in
particular project size and outreach, under individual and group lending. One of the papers that
does perform this exercise is de Quidt al. (2012) who compares the behavior of for-profit MFIs
with market power, with not-for-profit lenders. They consider a framework with simultaneous
lending and social capital. They find that the MFI prefers group contracts when the social
capital is large. In contrast to our results however, they find that borrowers always prefer a
group lending contract to an individual lending contract.
6 Effects of Competition: Transition to Individual Lending?
In recent years there has been a large increase in competition in the MFI sector all over the world,
including in India. While such competition has been linked to various issues in the literature,
e.g. double-dipping, default and even farmer suicides,27 here we focus on a phenomenon that
was roughly contemporaneous with the increase in MFI competition, namely a move away from
group to individual lending in many cases. While such a transition can of course be triggered
by various reasons, e.g. by an exogenous coordinated shock in the form of a cyclone as in case of
Grameen I, we shall argue that our framework can provide a rich explanation for this transition
that links it to the increased competition among MFIs.
To this end we focus on several possible effects of such increased competition, namely (i)
increased competition for donor funds, possibly resulting in a higher opportunity cost of fund c
for the MFIs, (ii) mission drift, leading to a fall in β, (iii) an increase in the reservation utility
of the borrowers, i.e. u¯, as the borrowers have access to competing MFIs and (iv) a decrease in
26This argument uses the fact N
n∗ is an integer. If this was not the case, one could choose mˆ to be the largest
integer for which mˆn∗ ≤ N and then use a mixed scheme, where mˆn∗ borrowers are served under the group
regime while the remaining borrowers N − mˆn∗ are served individually. The total payoff from this scheme must
be strictly higher than the individual regime whenever λ < λ∗.
27Please see Guha and Roy Chowdhury, 2013, 2014, and Quidt et al., 2012, for a discussion.
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social sanctions.28,29
6.1 Change in the Opportunity Cost of Fund for the MFI
To examine the impact of a small increase in c, totally differentiate equations (18) and (19)
with respect to c, to get
dkI
dc
=
1
F ′′(kI)− (1− β)b′′(kI) ,
dkg
dc
=
1
F ′′(kg)− (1− β)b′′(kg)/2 .
From A.2, it is immediate that dkIdc < 0 and
dkg
dc < 0. Thus with an increase in c, the optimal
project size decreases under both individual and group lending regimes. Further, since the
payoffs of all borrowers equal b(kI) under individual, and b(kg)/2 under group lending, the
payoff to a borrower must also decrease since project size decreases under both lending schemes.
To examine the effect on the per borrower payoff WI of the MFI, one can use the envelope
theorem to show that dWIdc = −kI , and dWgdc = −kg, so that both WI and Wg decreases with
an increase in c. Further, since kg > kI , Wg increases relatively more compared to WI , so that
Wg−WI increases. Thus from equation (20), it follows that λ∗ will decrease for a small increase
in c making group lending less profitable.30
6.2 For-profit MFIs: Change in β
Increase in competition among MFIs is likely to be associated with mission drift, formalised
as a decline in β.31 How does a small change in β affect the outcome? Totally differentiating
equations (18) and (19) with respect to β, we find that
dkI
dβ
= − b
′(kI)
F ′′(kI)− (1− β)b′′(kI) ,
dkg
dβ
= − b
′(kg)/2
F ′′(kg)− (1− β)b′′(kg)/2 .
Given A.2, the optimal project size decreases under both individual, as well as group lending
regimes with a fall in β. Consequently, the payoff to a borrower must also decrease under both
lending schemes.
We next examine how a change in β affects the per borrower payoff W (k, r; c, β) of the MFI
under both regimes. From the envelope theorem note that under individual lending dWIdβ =
∂WI
∂β = b(kI), whereas
dWg
dβ =
∂Wg
∂β =
b(kg)
2 under group-lending. With a decrease in β, both WI
and Wg will decline. However, Wg will decline relatively more compared to WI , if and only if
28Further, consider a scenario where the interest rate is exogenously fixed by a regulatory agency/government,
but is susceptible, in the long run, to competitive pressures. Chowdhury et al. (2014) shows that an increase
in the number of MFIs would, under certain conditions, cause a switch to individual lending in the long run if
competitive pressures force the government to lower the interest rates.
29Formally, the argument depends on how these factors affect λ∗. Given Proposition 5(iii), an increase in λ∗
indicates whether group lending becomes relatively more profitable compared to individual lending.
30This argument assumes that n
∗f
2
> b(kg) − pi(kg, rg). If the constraint on n∗ binds, one needs to consider
the effect of change in n∗ since with an increase in c, pi(kg, rg) will decrease and this may necessitate an increase
n∗. However, as long as G(n)/n does not increase too quickly with n, we expect our result to hold.
31Given the recent crisis in the MFI sector in Andhra Pradesh, India following the entry of large MFIs (de
Quidt et al., 2012), the analysis of for-profit MFIs and the possibility of mission drift have gained in importance.
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b(kI) <
b(kg)
2 . Thus, under the same conditions, λ
∗ will decrease following a small decrease in
β, and group-lending becomes relatively less attractive to the MFI.
6.3 Reservation Utility
With increased MFI competition, one can expect the reservation utility of the borrowers, u, to
increase as they have the option of moving to other MFIs. In order to address the effects of such
a change we next explicitly introduce the individual rationality constraint of the borrower, i.e.
pi(k, r)−u¯ ≥ 0. For ease of exposition, we focus on the situation where the individual rationality
constraint of the borrower is binding under both the lending regimes. In such a case, both Wg
and WI must decrease with an increase in u¯. However, it can be shown that Wg decreases at
a faster rate than WI resulting in a decrease in λ
∗. Thus, an increase in u¯, associated with
increased competition among MFIs may result in individual lending becoming relatively more
profitable.32
6.4 Social Sanctions
Since social capital/sanctions is one response to incomplete/thin markets, we conjecture that
with an increase in MFI competition these mechanisms may become less effective. Moreover,
with the sustained process of urbanization going on in most LDCs, it may be argued that
social capital would decline among rural borrowers. How does this affect the trade-off between
group and individual lending?33 To begin with note that a change in f does not affect (kg, ng).
However, from Proposition 2 we know that the group size n∗ must satisfy n
∗f
2 ≥ b(kg)−pi(kg, rg).
Thus, a sustained fall in f will lead to an increase in n∗. Given that G(n) is convex and G(0) = 0,
it then follows from equation (20) that λ∗ will decrease. Consequently, with a decline in social
capital, individual lending will become relatively more attractive for the MFIs.
Interestingly enough, the first two comparative statics results hinge on the basic theoretical
point of our paper, namely that the no default constraint is relaxed under group lending, allowing
for greater project sizes.
7 Conclusion
Given the recent success of micro-finance, in particular the high rates of repayment,34 there
is a natural interest in examining whether the innovative institutional features, in particular
dynamic features like sequential financing and dynamic joint liability used by many MFIs, play
a role in their success. We argue that a unified explanation of both these aspects can be built
around dynamic incentives, in particular the simple idea that sequential lending can help resolve
problems arising out of coordinated default. Further it helps clarify how social capital interacts
with sequential financing in incentivizing repayment. In fact, this is one of the few papers in the
literature that helps explain the mixed empirical findings regarding the impact of social capital.
In addition, the present framework also provides an explanation for early and frequent
repayment schemes. Inter alia, it identifies a synergy between IFR and sequential lending,
arguing that a lending mechanism involving both is more than the sum of its parts. Moreover,
32This result however may not necessarily hold when u¯ is small and the reservation utility constraint is not
binding under the individual lending regime (see Chowdhury et al. (2014)).
33We are indebted to a anonymous commentator for drawing our attention to this possibility.
34Hossein (1988), Morduch (1999) and Christen et al. (1994), all argue that the Grameen Bank has a repayment
rate in excess of 90 percent.
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this synergistic effect has important implications for empirical analysis as well, suggesting that
while testing for the efficacy of group lending, any analysis that considers either sequential
lending or IFR in isolation, may seriously under-estimate the power of the two taken together.35
Further, the tractability of the basic model allows us to endogenize the choice of several
variables of interest, including the choice of loan scheme, one of the few papers in the literature
to do so. Finally, we put our theory to the test, examining if it can provide an explanation of
a somewhat puzzling fact, namely the switch from group to individual lending in recent years.
We trace this transition to the increase in MFI competition that happened at the same time.
Further, we show that the intuition for this result hinges on the basic theoretical point of our
paper, namely that the no default constraint is relaxed under group lending.
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